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SPEECH
Abuses of Presidential Power:
Impeachment as a Remedy
HON. ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN*
In light of this symposium's rich discussion about such issues as
the mistreatment of detainees and torture, I want to look at the problem
of the uses and abuses of executive power from a somewhat different,
more "macro" perspective. I want to examine the role of checks and
balances in underpinning our democracy and what we can do to fulfill
the vision of the Framers of our Constitution-who feared concentration
of power precisely because of the threat it posed to our liberties-when
they established our system of government.
We have an administration in Washington that has defied the rule
of law in many serious ways. This would have not surprised the Fram-
ers. As students of history, they understood that executives could-and
undoubtedly would-abuse the power of their office. In this sense, they
anticipated Presidents such as Richard M. Nixon and George W. Bush,
and they gave us the ultimate weapon to deal with them: the power of
impeachment.' That power was specifically designed to protect our
democracy from Presidents who refused to respect the rule of law.
The question that confronts us today is whether and how to use this
power.
Let me just pause for a moment to consider the Framers' view of
impeachment. As we know, when they drafted the Constitution, they
were concerned about the misuse of power, which is why they created a
system of checks and balances. The Framers were especially worried
about executive power, which was understandable given that they had
* The author received a Juris Doctor from Harvard Law School. She served as
Congresswoman from the Sixteenth Congressional District of New York in the U.S. House of
Representatives from 1973-81. As a congresswoman, she played a key role on the House
Judiciary Committee during the impeachment hearings of President Richard Nixon. In 2006, she
coauthored a book with Cynthia L. Cooper, arguing for the impeachment of George W. Bush. See
ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN WITH CYNTHIA L. COOPER, THE IMPEACHMENT OF GEORGE W. BUSH: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR CONCERNED CITIZENS (2006).
I. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
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just thrown off the yoke of a monarchy. As a consequence, they created
many constraints on the presidency such as a limited term of four years,
a Congress with substantial powers, and a Supreme Court looking over a
President's shoulder. States were given their own authority to act. But
even this, the Framers recognized, was not enough.
The Framers knew that, despite all the checks they had put in place,
a President could still commit terrible acts that would warrant removal
from office. How to deal with that possibility was the challenge. The
Framers' answer was to dust off an old British parliamentary practice
called impeachment. Initially, there was opposition to the idea. After
all, the Framers did not want unduly to weaken the presidency or
strengthen the legislative branch. Nonetheless, the Framers were per-
suaded of its necessity. They understood that Presidents could so abuse
the power of office and so threaten democracy that they would have to
be removed from office-even though doing so would entail overturn-
ing an election, itself a hallmark of democracy.
Initially, the Framers suggested impeachment for treason. Treason
is defined in the Constitution as levying war against the United States or
providing aid and comfort to its enemies.2 But this was deemed insuffi-
cient to protect the nation from Presidents run amok. George Mason, a
delegate from Virginia, noted that treason would not cover "many great
and dangerous offences" or "[a]ttempts to subvert the Constitution."3
He suggested, and the Constitutional Convention agreed, to add two
other grounds for impeachment: bribery, and high crimes and
misdemeanors.4
Bribery is a well-known concept, but what are high crimes and mis-
demeanors? As a member of the House Judiciary Committee that under-
took impeachment proceedings against President Richard Nixon, I had
the opportunity to consider that question. Indeed, the Committee itself
carefully studied the meaning of the term. Essentially, we determined
that "high crimes and misdemeanors" encompassed grave and serious
abuses of presidential power. We also determined that the conduct did
not have to be criminal; in other words, it did not have to violate a
provision of the U.S. Criminal Code.
Article II, of the three Articles of Impeachment drawn up against
President Nixon, is based entirely on this understanding of the Constitu-
2. See id. art. III, § 3, cl. I ("Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying
war against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall
be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on
Confession in open Court.").
3. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 550 (Max Farrand, ed. 1966).
4. See id.
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tion.5 This Article, by the way, garnered the most Republican votes. It
charged President Nixon, among other things, with abusing the powers
of his office by illegal wiretapping; creating an "enemies list" of persons
who opposed the Vietnam War or supported his opponent George
McGovern; ordering the IRS to conduct harassing audits of his oppo-
nents; failing to correct false testimony given by his attorney general to
the Senate, among many other things.
I will begin with the misconduct of President Bush that most
clearly falls within the Nixon precedent-this misconduct startled me,
when it was first disclosed in the New York Times,6 into realizing that
President Bush was committing impeachable offenses. This was Presi-
dent Bush's refusal to obey the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 ("FISA")7 with respect to a certain category of wiretaps. That law
requires the President to seek court approval for foreign intelligence
wiretaps,8 but President Bush was refusing to do so.
President Nixon, like President Bush, claimed that when national
security was involved he had the unilateral power to wiretap. In other
words, he claimed full powers as commander in chief to do what he
pleased, regardless of the law. As with President Bush, Nixon con-
tended that his wiretaps were for national security purposes. But the
Nixon wiretaps-which involved nearly two dozen journalists9 and
White House staffers 1°-were not for national security purposes. One
of the wiretaps involved a staffer who had gone to work for Democratic
presidential candidate Edmund Muskie, a fact that permitted the Nixon
White House to have a direct pipeline into a key opponent's campaign.I'
The House Judiciary Committee determined, on a bipartisan basis,
that a President of the United States may not take the law into his own
hands and that the illegal wiretapping constituted grounds for President
5. See H.R. JUDICIARY COMM., IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, art. 11 (1974), available at http://classes.lls.edu/archive/
manheimk/371 d 1/nixonarticles.html.
6. See Noah Feldman, Who Can Check the President?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, § 6
(Magazine), at 52; see also Neil A. Lewis, Rule Created Legal 'Wall' to Sharing Information,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2004, at A19.
7. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1863 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
8. See id. §§ 1804-1806. FISA specifically requires the U.S. attorney general to approve
a,)y application to conduct "electronic surveillance" for the purpose of obtaining "foreign
intelligence information." Id. §§ 1803-1804. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court must
subsequently approve the application from the U.S. attorney general. Id.
9. See Note, Who's Listening: Proposals for Amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, 70 VA. L. REV. 297, 312 n.65 (1984).
10. See Jeff Breinholt, How About a Little Perspective: The USA PATRIOT Act and the Uses
and Abuses of History, 9 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 17, 40 (2004).
11. See A Verdict Against Richard Nixon, TIME, Dec. 27, 1976, available at http://
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,947789,00.html.
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Nixon's impeachment. As a direct result of President Nixon's illegal
wiretapping, and subsequent revelations of CIA and FBI misconduct in
the surveillance of Americans, Congress adopted the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 1978, and President Jimmy Carter signed it
into law.
The centerpiece of FISA is its requirement that foreign intelligence
wiretaps be approved by a court.' 2 Congress had seen the abuses that
occurred when a President wiretapped without any independent check
and wanted to be sure there was a check. But Congress granted leeway.
In an emergency, court approval could be obtained shortly after the
wiretap commenced. By creating a special court to handle FISA wiretap
applications, Congress also expected the court to develop expertise that
would permit it to act speedily and knowledgeably on these applications.
From my own experience, I can say how important an outside
check is. I served for eight years as District Attorney of Brooklyn, New
York. When my office wanted to commence a wiretap, I personally had
to sign the application requesting court approval. Knowing that the
application had to go to the court meant that our office had to pay care-
ful attention and ensure that these were solid grounds when we made
our request. Even though these applications were generally granted, the
very process of seeking court approval acted as a check on unwarranted
and unjustified requests. For prosecutors, court approval for wiretaps is
standard operating procedure.
But President Bush bridled at the FISA requirement. From the fall
of 2001 to 2007-the dates are not certain-he did not submit any wire-
tap applications involving a special category of wiretaps to the FISA
Court for approval, undertaking them unilaterally. As he saw it, he was
commander in chief, and no court was going to tell him what to do. The
President's refusal could not have been based on any concern that the
FISA Court was overly tough on wiretap applications. From 1978 until
approximately 2006, the FISA Court approved more than 19,000 appli-
cations and rejected five.13
A President cannot simply refuse to obey the law-not even when
he invokes his powers as commander in chief-because the Constitution
says clearly and explicitly that the President must take care that the laws
are faithfully executed.' 4 That provision creates a kind of double-
whammy, a double imperative: The President must "take care" to exe-
12. See §§ 1802(b), 1805.
13. See Electronic Privacy Information Center, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Orders
1979-2006, http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa-stats.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
14. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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cute the laws and must do so "faithfully."15 The repetition emphasizes
the importance of the President's obligation to carry out the nation's
laws, not violate them.
In spurning court approval, President Bush violated not only the
explicit terms of FISA and the constitutional requirement to execute the
laws faithfully, but he also flouted the precedent on illegal wiretapping
established by the Nixon impeachment proceedings. Finally, he defied a
Supreme Court case that is directly on point about the powers of the
commander in chief. The case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer 16 (the so-called Steel Seizure case), is one of the most important in
presidential war powers jurisprudence. During the Korean War, Presi-
dent Truman was confronted with the possibility of a strike by steel
workers. 7 Worried that the strike would strangle America's ability to
make the bullets, guns, tanks, and planes needed to fight the war effec-
tively, President Truman invoked his powers as commander in chief and
ordered the military to take over the steel mills and keep them running.
18
The Supreme Court rejected President Truman's claim that he had
the power to do this. 9 In his concurrence, one of the most famous opin-
ions in the Court's history, Justice Robert Jackson pointedly noted that
"the Constitution did not contemplate that the title Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy will constitute [the President] also Commander in
Chief of the country."20 For Jackson, there was a light-year of differ-
ence between the two. A commander in chief of the military forces is
still subordinate to civilian powers. A commander in chief of the coun-
try is a military dictator.
Justice Jackson brought a unique perspective to this case. He was
the chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials.2 ' He saw up close the
horrific consequences of tyranny, of unchecked executive power. This
experience shaped his response to President Truman's invocation of
expansive power as commander in chief. Noting that the Framers were
responding to the "evils" of unlimited powers exercised by George III,2
Jackson added: "[I]f we seek instruction from our own times, we can
match it only from the executive powers in those governments we dis-
paragingly describe as totalitarian. 23
15. See id. ("[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed .... ").
16. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
17. See id. at 582-83, 603-04.
18. Id. at 583.
19. See id. at 585-89.
20. Id. at 643-44 (Jackson, J., concurring).
21. WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL 11 (rev. ed. 1999).
22. See 343 U.S. at 641 (Jackson, J, concurring).
23. Id.
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In response to the claim that the President's power as commander
in chief trumped all else, Jackson wrote the following: "No penance
would ever expiate the sin against free government of holding that a
President can escape control of executive powers by law through assum-
ing his military role."24 In other words, allowing military power to
supersede the rules of civilian government is an unforgivable and
profound assault on free government itself.
President Bush apparently did not have Youngstown on his summer
reading list, not to mention the U.S. Constitution itself, or a history of
the Nixon impeachment proceedings. In any case, there is no question
that the President's refusal to obey the FISA law is a great and danger-
ous offense that subverts the Constitution. The administration's recent
claim that it has now found it possible to obey FISA and to drop its past
practice of using warrantless FISA wiretaps 25 suggests that the President
could have complied with FISA earlier had he wanted to.
When confronted with a law that is ineffective, harmful, or out-
dated, a President is not faced with the unpalatable choice of implement-
ing it or violating it; a President has the power to go to Congress and get
the law changed. But for years, President Bush refused to seek changes
in FISA that would eliminate the defect that he claimed caused him to
ignore its requirements in the special category of wiretaps. In fact, the
President knew very well how to amend FISA. After September 11, he
persuaded Congress to extend the time to obtain a retroactive FISA war-
rant from twenty-four to seventy-two hours.2 6
A President who refuses repeatedly to obey a law written explicitly
to prevent unilateral invocation of national-security wiretapping, and
thereby seriously invades the privacy of Americans, commits an
impeachable offense. It is worth noting that violation of FISA is a
felony.27
The second ground for impeaching President Bush has to do with
his use of fraud and deception to drive the United States into war in Iraq.
Here again, we need to go back and examine the constitutional roots of
war powers.
The Framers understood the horrors of war and its immense cost in
lives and treasure. They were not wimps or pacifists. They had just
fought and won a war against Great Britain. But they were great readers
24. Id. at 646.
25. See James Bamford, Op-Ed., Bush Is Not Above the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2007, at
A 19.
26. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. 107-108, § 1314(a)(1),
115 Stat. 1394, 1402 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(4)); see also James Risen &
Eric Lichtblau, Rice Defends Domestic Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2005, at A28.
27. See 50 U.S.C. § 1809 (2000).
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of history-they understood that executives were most likely to take
their countries into foolhardy and costly military adventures, and they
were determined to protect against that tendency in the Constitution they
wrote. Thus, when the Framers gave many war-making powers to Con-
gress, this was not merely an abstract exercise in checks and balances.
They specifically intended to make it harder to take the country to war
without substantial justification. As Madison explained in a letter to Jef-
ferson: "The constitution supposes, what the History of all
Gov[ernmen]ts demonstrates, that the Ex[ecutive] is the branch of power
most interested in war, & most prone to it. It has accordingly with stud-
ied care, vested the question of war in the Legisl[ature]. ''28
Let us look at how the Constitution apportions the war-making
powers. It gives the President only one power, that of commander in
chief of the Army and Navy.29 Congress has many powers. For exam-
ple, it has the power to declare war;3° raise and support an army and
navy;3' make rules for regulation of land and naval forces; 32 make rules
concerning captures on land and sea;3 3 define and punish offenses
against the laws of nation;34 and make laws necessary and proper for
implementing those specific powers.
For the Framers, the decision to go to war-the most serious deci-
sion a nation can make-was to be as deliberative as possible. When
Congress-and through it the American people-are deprived of their
ability to make a thoughtful determination about going to war, because
they are not given the facts or are given false information, that is a sub-
version of the Constitution. And that is what occurred with respect to
the Iraq war.
Although the administration has refused to release all the informa-
tion about the lead-up to the war-in other words what President Bush
knew and when he knew it, to paraphrase the well-known Watergate
question-we still have enough information to warrant impeachment.
Using the standard set in the Nixon proceeding, we have to focus on
President Bush's own conduct. With respect to violations of FISA, for
example, we know that the President was directly involved because he
28. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 2, 1798), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 311, 312 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
29. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. I ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States .....
30. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. II.
31. Id. cl. 12.
32. Id. cl. 14.
33. Id. cl. 11.
34. Id. cl. 10.
35. Id. cl. 18.
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personally signed the authorization for the warrantless wiretaps and did
so repeatedly.
With respect to the Iraq war, we know that the President himself
engaged in deliberate deception. The first example has to do with his
repeated suggestions-and those of his top subordinates, whom he did
not correct-that Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda were in cahoots.36
Repeatedly, and in various ways, President Bush suggested that Saddam
and al Qaeda were intertwined, connected, working together. This
allowed the President and his administration to imply-although the
President never said so directly-that Saddam bore responsibility for
September 11, which would justify going to war against Iraq. (Accord-
ing to some, such as former Bush Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, Pres-
ident Bush had already decided to invade Iraq when he first took
office.)3 7 As a result of the President's disinformation campaign, by the
time we invaded Iraq, more than 50% of Americans thought Saddam
Hussein was responsible for September 11.38 When interviewed on tele-
vision during the early days of the war, our soldiers in Iraq were saying
things like "I am here because this is payback for September 11."
Of course, that was not true, and the President knew it wasn't true.
How do we know that? Let's go to a personal conversation that Presi-
dent Bush had shortly after September 11 when he convened his top
security team to consider what action to take in response to the attack on
us. After the meeting, the President "grabbed" Clarke and directed him
to "see if Saddam did" 9/11 or was "linked in any way" to it. Astounded
Clarke told the President that "al Qaeda did this." He then pointed out
that no "real linkages to Iraq" were found despite looking "several
times." The President testily repeated his command and walked away.39
36. See Glenn Kessler, Invoking 9/11 May Temper Views on Iraq War, WASH. POST, Sept. 5,
2004, at A5 ("[I]nvestigations after the war, such as the inquiry by the bipartisan Sept. 11
commission, have largely disproved the alleged connections [between Saddam Hussein and al
Qaeda]. Yet in their convention speeches, the president and vice president linked Sept. 11 and
Iraq even more tightly than before.").
37. See Bush Sought 'Way' To Invade Iraq?, CBS NEWS, Jan. 11, 2004, http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/01/09/60minutes/main592330.shtml.
38. See RICHARD CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA'S WAR ON TERROR 241
(2004); Kathy Frankovic, Polls, Truth Sometimes at Odds, CBS NEWS, Sept. 12, 2007, http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/09/12/opinion/pollpositions/main3253552.shtml.
39. In his book, Clarke recalls this conversation that he had with President Bush on
September 12, 2001:
[The President] grabbed a few of us and closed the door to the conference room.
"Look," he told us, "I know you have a lot to do and all ... but I want you, as soon
as you can, to go back over everything, everything. See if Saddam did this. See if
he's linked in any way ... "
I was once again taken aback, incredulous, and it showed. "But, Mr. President,
al Qaeda did this."
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In response to the President's directive, Clarke pulled together a
meeting of top counter-terrorism experts who agreed with Clarke's con-
clusion. Clarke sent a memo to that effect to the President. The memo
came back with a note scrawled on it: "Wrong answer."4 (The note was
not written by the President.)
Even if President Bush never got Clarke's memo, he still had heard
from Clarke personally. Nonetheless, he continued to repeat the Sad-
dam-Bin Laden connection. Even on May 1, 2003, during his trium-
phant Mission Accomplished moment aboard the aircraft carrier,
President Bush announced the following: "The liberation of Iraq is a
crucial advance in the campaign against terror. We've removed an ally
of al Qaeda, and cut off a source of terrorist funding."41
There is another example of how President Bush knowingly or
recklessly deceived the country and Congress, which involved his State
of the Union message in January 2003, just a few weeks before we
invaded Iraq. In giving reasons for the upcoming invasion, the President
invoked the nuclear threat posed by Iraq. He said, "The British govern-
ment has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quan-
tities of uranium from Africa."4 Aside from the fact that the statement
was based on false information, think about the allusion to the British
government. Why would the President of the United States cite infor-
mation from a foreign government as a key ground for going to war?
Because he could not cite information from U.S. agencies. The CIA, the
State Department, and other U.S. agencies knew that the uranium story
was hogwash. In fact, several months earlier, CIA Director George
Tenet had called the National Security Advisor's office (and sent a
memo), noting the problematic nature of the uranium claim and warning
that the President should not use it in an upcoming speech in Cincinnati.
The uranium reference was taken out of that speech.43
What did the President know about all of this? Even though we
"I know, I know, but ... see if Saddam was involved. Just look. I want to
know any shred..."
"Absolutely, we will look.., again." I was trying to be more respectful, more
responsive. "But, you know, we have looked several times for state sponsorship of
al Qaeda and not found any real linkages to Iraq. Iran plays a little, as does
Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, Yemen."
"Look into Iraq, Saddam," the President said testily and left us.
CLARKE, supra note 38, at 32.
40. See Clarke's Take on Terror, CBS NEWS, Mar. 21, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2004/03/19/60minutes/main607356.shtml.
41. See President George W. Bush, President Bush Announces Combat Operations in Iraq
Have Ended (May 1, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rmV20203.htm.
42. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.
43. Tenet Faces Grilling over Uranium Intelligence, CNN.COM, July 16, 2003, http://
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have not been provided with his prewar briefings, we can still draw
some useful conclusions. Assuming he did not know that his uranium
claim was false before giving his State of the Union speech, the Presi-
dent at least had to have read and practiced the speech. This presents
two possibilities. First, when reviewing or rehearsing the speech, the
President asked what U.S. intelligence thought about the British infor-
mation-in which case he was undoubtedly told the truth and thus knew
that what he was saying was untrue. Or, second, he didn't ask anything
about it-in which case he was reckless about taking the country to war
on a basis of what another country thought without learning what our
intelligence agencies had to say about it. Failure to explore a major
ground for going to war would show a grotesque indifference to his
constitutional responsibilities to execute the laws faithfully, including
the law authorizing him to invade Iraq.
The President's national-security staff was also presented with
other important information that undermined the claim that Saddam
posed a nuclear threat to us. Aside from the false Niger uranium claim,
the only other basis for the mushroom-cloud argument was that Saddam
had purchased certain aluminum tubes, which, according to the CIA,
were useful only for nuclear weapons." But two U.S. agencies, the
Department of Energy, which is the main agency dealing with nuclear
weapons, and the State Department, believed that the tubes were not
suitable for nuclear weapons.45 The job of the national security advisor,
then Condoleezza Rice, was to reconcile the divergent positions held by
these agencies. Nonetheless, neither the public nor Congress was
informed about these disagreements within the administration-or that
any agency was seriously questioning the mushroom-cloud scare.
Significantly, after it became clear that the aluminum-tubes claim
as well as the uranium claim were false46 (and the administration's other
claims about chemical and biological weapons were also untrue), Presi-
dent Bush did not punish either Ms. Rice or her deputy, Stephen Hadley,
for their sorry role in misinforming Congress and the American people
about the phony nuclear threat from Iraq. (Hadley took responsibility
for the appearance of the yellow-cake uranium charge in the State of the
www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/07/16/white.house.tenet; Timeline of the Iraq Uranium
Imbroglio, ABCNEWS.COM, Oct. 1, 2003, http://abcnews.go.comInternational/story?id=79393.
44. See Max Frankel, The Washington Back Channel, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007, § 6
(Magazine), at 40; Editorial, The Nuclear Bomb That Wasn't, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2004, at A22.
45. See Editorial, Playing Hardball with Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2006, at A24 ("[T]he
State Department and the Energy Department had concluded that it also was not true that Iraq
bought aluminum tubes to enrich uranium. During his State of the Union address in 2003, Mr.
Bush said flatly that it was true.").
46. See Richard W. Stevenson, After the War: Nuclear Rationale, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2004,
at A13.
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Union speech.)47 Instead, he rewarded them: Ms. Rice became secretary
of state, and Mr. Hadley, national security advisor. Was it because they
did their job too well? The mushroom-cloud scare, the disinformation
campaign had worked: The United States invaded Iraq with authoriza-
tion from Congress and substantial public support.
A third ground for impeachment involves President Bush's failure
to take care that the laws regarding detainees in war time were faithfully
executed. The President's "take care" responsibility applies not only to
laws, but to ratified treaties as well, which, like U.S. statutes, are the law
of the land.4 8 This means the Geneva Conventions, as well as the stat-
utes implementing them-the War Crimes Act of 199649 and the Anti-
Torture Act°--must be obeyed, not violated.
But that was not the case. President Bush himself personally set in
motion the process that led ultimately to Abu Ghraib. Even the Presi-
dent has conceded that the events at Abu Ghraib caused the United
States incalculable harm.51
In February 2002 President Bush declared that, although the
Geneva Convention protections applied to members of the Taliban, they
did not apply to members of al Qaeda.52 The same "harsh" interrogation
techniques 53 that were used against detainees in Afghanistan and Guan-
tanamo later "migrated" to Iraq where the Geneva Convention did
apply. 54 The President's authorizations of interrogation techniques have
not been made public.55
47. See Profile: Stephen Hadley, BBC NEws, Nov. 16, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/4017871.stm (quoting Hadley as saying, "I should have recalled at the time of the State
of the Union speech that there was controversy associated with the uranium issue").
48. U.S. CONST. art. VI § 2.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000).
50. Id. §§ 2340-2340A.
51. See Mike Allen & Dan Balz, On Arab TV, President Says U.S. Is "Appalled," WASH.
POST, May 6, 2004, at A .
52. See Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: Captives; in Shift, Bush Says Geneva
Rules Fit Taliban Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at Al.
53. See Neil A. Lewis, Broad Use of Harsh Tactics Is Described at Cuba Base, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 2004, § 1, at 1.
54. See Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations (The
Schlesinger Report), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 915 (Karen J.
Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel, eds. 2005).
55. In February 2008 U.S. officials admitted that "waterboarding," a practice most legal
scholars consider torture or "cruel and inhuman" treatment-and thus a likely violation of U.S.
criminal statutes-was performed on at least three detainees by CIA agents. See Charlie Savage,
AG Won't Probe CIA on Torture Laws: Says Justice Dept. Memos Signed Off on Waterboarding,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 8, 2008, at A2. The President authorized the interrogation. See Catherine
Philp, CIA Admits 'Waterboarding' of Terror Suspects, TIMES (London), Feb. 7, 2008, at 36.
Although it is not clear that he specifically authorized the waterboarding, his failure to condemn
water boarding and the White House view that he can authorize it in the future suggests that he
did.
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Under the Geneva Conventions, the President was obligated to
bring to justice those responsible for the mistreatment of detainees;5 6 he
also had an obligation to enforce the War Crimes Act of 1996 and the
Anti-Torture Act-but he did not carry out these obligations. In the
wake of the Abu Ghraib revelations, the President designated Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to determine what went wrong.57 The
appointment of Rumsfeld was itself a ploy to ensure a limited investiga-
tion. Rumsfeld, for starters, had no jurisdiction to review matters
outside of the Department of Defense, such as prosecutions under the
War Crimes Act or the Anti-Torture Act. Furthermore, Rumsfeld him-
self might have been guilty of violating the law: He admitted "ghosting"
a detainee-in other words, hiding a detainee from the International Red
Cross, a violation of the Geneva Conventions.58 If the "ghosting" ena-
bled mistreatment of the detainee, Rumsfeld might have also violated
U.S. statutes and committed a war crime. It was clear that Rumsfeld
would never investigate himself.
In a maneuver of enormous cynicism, Rumsfeld set up a variety of
investigations that all had an exceedingly narrow scope-one investiga-
tion looked at the role of the military police, another at the role of mili-
tary intelligence, and so forth.5 9 The flurry of activity suggested
thoroughness. But in fact, there was no investigation created to look at
the total picture either horizontally-so all the agencies, including the
CIA, would be examined-or vertically-so that everyone in the chain
of command would be scrutinized. It should have been no surprise that
no higher-ups have been held responsible for the mistreatment of detain-
ees-and in some cases, those involved were promoted, given awards,
or praised.6" In effect, the misconduct was ratified and rewarded.6'
56. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
57. See Lewis, supra note 53.
58. See Douglas Jehl, Eric Schmitt & Kate Zemike, U.S. Rules on Prisoners Seen as a Back
and Forth of Mixed Messages to G.L 's, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2004, at A7 ("Defense Secretary
Donald H. Rumsfeld approved an order to hold a suspected Iraqi terrorist but to keep his name off
the prison rolls, effectively shielding the 'ghost detainee' from Red Cross inspectors.").
59. See Eric Schmitt, Rumsfeld Mischaracterizes Findings of 2 Studies on U.S. Abuse at Iraqi
Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2004, at A6.
60. Only one military officer who was at Abu Ghraib currently faces a court-martial for his
conduct there. See Army To Court-Martial Abu Ghraib Officer, CBS NEWS, Jan.26 2007, http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/01/26/iraq/main2403728.shtml?source=searchstory; Eric
Schmitt, Abuse Charge Set for a U.S. Colonel, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 26, 2006, at Al.
61. Alberto Gonzales, White House counsel who was later promoted to attorney general,
authored a January 2002 memorandum to President Bush calling the Geneva Conventions
"obsolete" and recommending that they not be applied. See Memorandum from Alberto R.
Gonzales, counsel to the President, to the President (Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE
PAPERS, supra note 54, at 118. Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General who was later promoted
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sent a memorandum to Mr. Gonzales
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A final ground for impeachment is the President's failure to execute
the law faithfully with respect to Hurricane Katrina. At the outset, let
me note that the Framers were well aware that the impeachment power
could be abused. For that reason, they rejected the proposal that a Presi-
dent be impeached for maladministration. They knew that problems in
administration, both large and small, could plague any presidency and
would thus give Congress far too much power and weaken the
presidency.
We have seen abuse of the impeachment power by Congress. The
Andrew Johnson impeachment was highly partisan. The Clinton
impeachment was similarly partisan-no Democrat supported it in the
House-and did not meet the constitutional standard that requires an
abuse of the powers of his office, not merely reprehensible conduct.
Although this may be a self-interested comment, the Nixon impeach-
ment proceedings, which have withstood historical scrutiny, show that
Congress can act responsibly and fairly on impeachment.
President Bush's response to Katrina was not a matter of mere mal-
administration. Under the structure of federal laws governing disasters,
as was noted in a report prepared by House Republicans, the President is
the commander in chief of hurricane relief.62 Thus, the President is in
charge of all hurricane relief; he is the only one who can fully mobilize
the whole federal government, including the military.
Just before Katrina made landfall, the President was personally
briefed via videoconference by the Director of the National Hurricane
Center ("NHC") and by Michael Brown (whom the President called
"Brownie"), the head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
("FEMA").6 3 Brown told the President that there was going to be a
catastrophe in New Orleans,64 and the Director of the NHC warned the
arguing that Congress could not constrain a President's commander-in-chief powers to interrogate
enemy combatants and thus, severely narrowing the definition of torture. See Memorandum of
Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug.
1, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 54, at 172-217. George Tenet, Director
of the CIA during the period when enhanced interrogations were being conducted, see GEORGE
TENET, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM: MY YEARS AT THE CIA 255 (2007), was awarded the
Presidential Medal of Freedom by President Bush in December 2004. See The Official Site of the
Presidential Medal of Freedom, http://www.medaloffreedom.com/GeorgeTenet.htm (last visited
Mar. 25, 2008).
62. Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency Hurricane Supplemental
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 108-324, 118 Stat. 1220, 1220 (2005) (to be codified at scattered
sections of 10, 15 & 16 U.S.C.) (speaking of the President as commander in chief in the context of
hurricane emergencies).
63. Video Shows Bush, Chertoff Warned Before Katrina, USATODAY.COM, Mar. 2, 2006,
http://www.usatoday.comnews/nation/2006-03-01-video-katrina-warning-x.htm.
64. Brown specifically told the President: "We're going to need everything that we can
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President that the levies could be breached.65
Under the Constitution, President Bush is required to take care that
the laws on hurricane relief are faithfully executed. These laws give him
the power to mobilize all the resources of the federal government. In the
face of the imminent threat to thousands of lives and to one of the great
cities of America, what was the President's reaction? He appeared to
listen, but asked no questions. 66 He didn't ask: Have we done every-
thing we can? Have the troops been mobilized? Is there anything else the
federal government can do? Is there anything else that I can do? No.
Instead of asking questions or giving instructions, he said, "I know the
nation will be praying.., and we just hope for the very best. '67 Hoping
and praying are not what the "Take Care" mandate contemplates.
When faced with what he is told could be a catastrophe, when
thousands of lives are at stake, when he clearly has the power to act, he
cannot simply turn away from his responsibility to act. That does not
mean that the President could be impeached if he had tried to help and
did not succeed. Being ineffective may constitute maladministration and
is thus not impeachable; but doing nothing under these circumstances is
a high crime and misdemeanor-it is a gross and tragic failure to imple-
ment the Take Care Clause.
You may now ask, What does this all of this have to do with me?
The President, by means of deception, has driven us into a war that most
Americans now believe was a tragic mistake; he repeatedly put himself
above the rule of law with respect to wiretapping; he set into motion a
terrible series of events that led to Abu Ghraib and failed to enforce the
law against those responsible; and he turned away from his responsibil-
ity to help tens of thousands of Americans facing catastrophe in New
Orleans.
After the Constitutional Convention ended, Benjamin Franklin was
asked what had been created. His famous answer, "A republic.. . if you
can keep it."'68 The Impeachment Clause is what allows us to preserve
our democracy in the face of attempts to subvert the Constitution. Some
may argue that the answer to presidential misconduct lies at the polling
possibly muster, not only in this state and in the region, but the nation, to respond to this event."
Id. Brown also called the storm "a bad one, a big one." Id.
65. The director specifically said that the city's levees were "a very, very grave concern." Id.
66. Id. ("Bush appeared on the tape sitting at a table in a small room at his Crawford, Texas,
ranch. He didn't ask any questions.").
67. Hurricane Katrina Aug. 28, 2005 Video Conference, POPULARMECHANICS.COM, Mar. 6,
2006, http://www.popularmechanics.con/science/earth/2413906.html. For a video of some of the
conference that took place on August 28, 2005, see Transcripts, Tape Show Bush, Brown Warned
on Katrina, CNN.coM, Mar. 2, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2OO6/POLITICS/O3/O2/fema.tapes/
index.html (follow "Watch for Brown's warning and Bush's assurances-2:10" hyperlink).
68. 3 THE REcORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 3, at 85.
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place. The Framers did not think so. Impeachment allows us to stop
grave abuses of power without having to wait until the next election.
Just as important, impeachment sends a critical message to this and
future Presidents. It makes it clear that no one is above the rule of law.
It challenges the idea of impunity for those in high office.
If this President can engage in serious abuses of power without
being held to account-and serving out a term of office is not being held
to account-then future Presidents take from this that they can seriously
and systematically violate the Constitution without any penalty. If we
are committed to the rule of law, then impeachment is the path we must
follow. Unless a President has to pay a price for putting himself above
the law, then there is no ultimate safeguard for our democracy.
The Framers did not put the impeachment power in the hands of the
courts or the hands of the states. They put its initial use squarely in the
hands of the House of Representatives and thus in the hands of the
American people. So it is our responsibility, not that of any one else. If
we countenance a doctrine of presidential impunity, we'have failed to
carry out our responsibility to preserve our democracy. The battle for
our freedom is right here, and right now.
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